SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope
to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the more
interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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CONSTITUTIONAL
EMPOWERING

LAW-FIRST

AMENDMENT-REGULATION

PORT AUTHORITY TO EXERCISE STANDARDLESS

DISCRETION IN LIMITING THE DISTRIBUTION OF PRINTED MATERIAL RENDERED FACIALLY

INVALID-Gannett Satellite Informa-

tion Network Inc., v. Berger, 894 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990).
Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc. (Gannett), publishers of the daily newspaper, USA Today, sought permission to
install vending machines throughout Newark International Airport. 894 F.2d at 63. The Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey (Port Authority), pursuant to a provision of the Airport
Rules and Regulations which prohibited the unauthorized distribution of printed or written material in any terminal, denied
Gannett's request. Id. The Port Authority determined that private concessionaires adequately handled the distribution of USA

Today. Id.
When one of the principal concessionaires threatened to discontinue sale of the daily publication, Gannett filed suit on first
amendment grounds to protect its Newark Airport market. Id. at
64. Four months after the initiation of the Gannett suit, the Port
Authority substituted the challenged regulation with three new
provisions. Id. The new rules mandated consent to conduct any
commercial activity (Rule 2), banned the unauthorized use of
vending machines (Rule 3), and required written permission for
any materials concerning or referring to commercial activity
(Rule 10). Id.
In upholding the Port Authority's Rules and Regulations,
the district court rejected Gannett's contention that Rules 2, 3,
10, and the concessionaire leases containing certain exemptions
to the regulations resulted in facially invalid regulations empowering Port Authority officials with "standardless discretion to
censor written expression." Id. The district court found the primary thrust of the regulations was directed toward commercial
activity having no first amendment connection. Id. The district
court asserted that the regulations were not directed at expressive activity and, regardless of the non-viability of a facial challenge of these regulations, a facial challenge would reveal no
present threat of censorship. Id. The district court also refused
Gannett's claim that the denial of permission to install vending
machines "constituted a prior restraint in violation of the first
amendment." Id. Validating the Port Authority's restriction
upon the time, place, and manner of Gannett's expressive activ-
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ity, the district court concluded that the denial of permission to
install vending machines in a public forum was content-neutral
and narrowly tailored to serve significant government interests.
Id. Gannett appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit. Id.
Writing for the three-judge panel, Chief Judge Gibbons, set
forth that the focus of the appeal was upon the facial validity of
an alleged regulatory scheme. Id. at 65. The court noted that
Gannett's challenge invoked an "interesting exception to certain
well-accepted principles of justiciability." Id. (citation omitted).
The court distinguished the doctrine of justiciability from the
doctrine of standing and stated that the former applied because
Gannett did not suffer any first amendment injury. Id.
Without a challenge of the lower court's "as-applied" analysis, the court assumed that the district court correctly determined
that Newark Airport is a public forum and that the Port Authority's actions were valid restrictions upon the time, place, and
manner of Gannett's speech. Id. at 64-65. The court cited the
general rule ofjusticiability which requires a plaintiff to establish
an actual injury as opposed to a theoretical injury. Id. at 65. The •
court, however, stressed that the first amendment doctrine relaxes the personal injury requirement and thus, a restricted party
may be permitted to challenge a law which vests, in government
officials, standardless discretion to regulate speech. Id. (citing
Freedmanv. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56 (1965); Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940)).
The court emphasized the necessity of allowing nominally
injured plaintiffs the opportunity to challenge an overbroad statute in order to ensure the proper level of constitutional enforcement for present and future victims. Id. at 65-66. Because the
objective of fair standards for regulated speech would not be adequately achieved by piece-meal litigation, the court advocated
the application of a low threshold of personal injury to establish
the right to file suit. Id. at 66. Nevertheless, the court pointed
out that in order to successfully challenge a statute on overbreadth grounds, a litigant must prove more than a bare possibility that a specific grant of discretion to a government official may
be used unconstitutionally in some other setting. Id. The court
posited that the test to overturn a statute on first amendment
grounds is one in which government officials are granted overly
broad discretion to regulate speech specifically relating to expression, thus giving rise "to a 'real and substantial' risk of un-
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constitutional censorship." Id. (citing City of Lakewood v. Plain
Dealer Publishing, 108 S. Ct. 2138 (1988)).
Judge Gibbons characterized Gannett's argument that the
•Port Authority promulgated a regulatory scheme as one which
convolutes and obscures the first amendment issues raised. Id.
The court ascertained that the alleged scheme consisted of Rules
2, 3, 10, and the Port Authority's lease agreements with Newark
Airport concessionaires. Id. The court subsequently subjected
each of the four distinct components of the alleged regulatory
scheme to independent constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 66-70. Addressing the lease agreements, Judge Gibbons questioned Gannett's proposal suggesting that the Port Authority enact
standards which protect newspapers against potential abuse by
private concessionaires. Id. at 66-67. The court rejected this argument because it would operate contrary to settled principles of
state action and also run afoul of the same first amendment
under which Gannett sought relief. Id. at 67-68. The court explained that under the state action doctrine, actions of private
entities are immune from constitutional scrutiny unless the actions can be fairly construed as those of the state. Id. at 67 (citing
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974)). Acknowledging that the leases were obtained from a governmental entity,
the court maintained that the existence of a licensing agreement
does not create governmental liability for a private entity's activities. Id. (citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)).
The court declared that the concessionaires were neither subject
to constitutional scrutiny as private actors, nor should the Port
Authority entangle themselves in the concessionaires' decisions
regarding newspaper distribution. Id. at 68.
Subjecting Rules 2 & 3 to constitutional scrutiny, the court
determined that Rule 3 prohibited the installation of vending machines altogether, but should survive a facial attack because the
regulation did not grant discretion to Port Authority officials to
allow exceptions on a case-by-case basis. Id. Although Rule 2
does vest a considerable degree of discretion in Port Authority
officials, the court posited that Rule 2 was not aimed narrowly
and specifically at expression, but applied generally to commercial activity. Id. at 68-69. Moreover, the court emphasized that
Rule 2 passed constitutional muster because the regulation was
not severe enough to warrant judicial intervention prior to actual
misuse of discretion. Id. at 69 (citing City of Lakewood v. Plain
Dealer Publishing Co., 108 S. Ct. 2138, 2146 (1988)).
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Finally, in addressing whether Rule 10 actually regulated
only commercial speech, the court criticized the inclusion of the
expansive phrase "any printed or written matter concerning or
referring to commercial activity" and determined that the regulation was not confined to purely commercial speech because it affected the distribution of newspapers. Id. The court reiterated
that the success of Gannett's facial challenge of the regulation
was attributable to the Port Authority's failure to establish parameters for exercising its discretion. Id. Additionally, the court
held that Rule 10 had a close enough nexus to expression to pose
a real and substantial threat of censorship. Id. at 70 (citing City of
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 108 S. Ct. 2138, 2145
(1988)). In affirming in part and reversing in part, the court concluded that Rule 10 was invalid on its face and remanded the case
for redetermination of the district court's judgment insofar as it
dealt with Rule 10. Id.
In one of his last published opinions, Chief Judge John J.
Gibbons has sensitively articulated the complexity of legal issues
inherent in the first amendment. This case should not be viewed
as simply preserving convenient access to newspapers for the
travelling public. The court's decision in Gannett aims to insure
that government regulations concerning newspaper distribution
are carefully calculated. Thus, the Gannett Court properly applied the facial validity test developed by the United States
Supreme Court in Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 108 S.
Ct. 2138 (1988).
Interestingly, the Gannett decision can be viewed in combination with the recent decision overruling, on first amendment
grounds, the well-publicized New York City Mass Transit Authority regulation banning solicitation in the subway in Young v.
New York City Transit Authority, 729 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).

In Young, the district court held that begging represented a constitutional form of protected speech. Id. These decisions should
not go unappreciated within the arena of established first amendment law, as they illustrate that the permissible regulation of free
speech in public places can only occur if the government regulation sets narrow rules that are deemed to be reasonable limits on
the time, place, and manner of any given speech.
ChiefJudge Gibbons' opinion seems to suggest that governmental interests will prevail when the government entity utilizes
due care in drafting a regulation by selectively restricting certain
forms of expression rather than by being over-inclusive in the act
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of limiting permissibly restrictive speech. Taken to a dryly logical conclusion, Gannett may forshadow the government's willingness to narrow the scope of regulations in an attempt to
selectively prohibit forms of speech in any public forum desired.
Darin D. Pinto

EVIDENCE-BREATHALYZER TEST-RESULTS OF BREATHALYZER
ARE CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF DRUNK-DRIVINc--State v. Dow-

nie, 117 N.J. 450, 569 A.2d 242 (1990).
Andrew Downie failed a police administered breathalyzer
test and was charged with violating N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50(a)
(West 1988), which makes operating "a motor vehicle with a
blood alcohol concentration of .10% or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood" a criminal offense. 117 N.J. at 451,
569 A.2d at 242. The breathalyzer, a device used to determine
the amount of alcohol present in a person's arterial blood, computes the amount of alcohol in the brain by multiplying the individual's breath-alcohol level by 2,100. This partition ratio is
based upon a presumption that every 2,100 milliliters of exhaled
alveolar air, the last third of an expired deep breath, possesses an
equal amount of alcohol as does one milliliter of blood. Therefore, if a person's blood breath ratio is less than 2,100:1, the
breathalyzer may overestimate the amount of actual blood-alcohol and result in an erroneous conviction.
Downie argued that breathalyzer results were unreliable in
determining inebriation because partition ratios are dependent
on an individual's biochemistry. Consequently, pursuant to N.J.
CT. R. 3:13-1(b), Downie sought a pretrial hearing to establish
the unreliability of breathalyzer results. Id. at 452, 569 A.2d at
243. In order to economize on the expense of presenting expert
testimony, he moved to consolidate his case with those of other
defendants similarly charged. Although these cases occurred in
four different municipalities, a municipal judge granted the motion in order to resolve "common questions of law and fact." Id.
The Monmouth County Prosecutor appealed the consolidation
order. Id.
The law division determined that the order was improper,
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but allowed the defendants to present evidence concerning the
"admissibility and competency of the breathalyzer-test results."
Id. The appellate division reversed, holding that the challenge to
the reliability of the breathalyzer results was inadmissible. Id. at
452-53, 569 A.2d at 243. The court also found that although the
municipal court lacked authority to issue the consolidation order,
it could properly consider the evidence presented to economize
judicial resources. Id. at 453, 569 A.2d at 243. The New Jersey
Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and remanded the case
to the law division "to develop a factual record on the allegation
that partition ratio variability compromises the specific reliability
of the breathalyzer-test results." Id. Upon completion of the
lower court's determination, the supreme court affirmed the appellate division's conclusion that breathalyzer results are an accurate and reliable measure for ascertaining a violation of the
state's driving while intoxicated (DWI) statute. Id. at 463, 569
A.2d at 240.
Justice Garibaldi, writing for the majority, first discussed
how the human body undergoes two metabolic phases upon consumption of alcohol. Id. at 458, 569 A.2d at 245-46. The court
noted that the absorption phase begins with the initial ingestion
of alcohol and ceases when the blood reaches its highest alcohol
level. Id., 569 A.2d at 246. The post-absorptive phase, according to the justice, is evidenced by the reduction in blood-alcohol
level upon completion of the absorptive phase. Id. The court
explained that during the post-absorptive phase, the amount of
alcohol in the brain can be accurately measured by testing venous
blood, arterial blood, or breath. Id. The court noted, however,
that during the absorptive phase the most accurate measure of
intoxication is obtained with an arterial blood test. Id. Justice
Garibaldi pointed out that, due to biological factors, venous
blood tends to underestimate true brain-alcohol levels. Id.
Although arterial blood is the best indicator of brain-alcohol
levels, the majority stressed that the procedure to draw blood
from the carotid artery is too intricate and dangerous for law enforcement purposes. Id. at 459, 569 A.2d at 246. The court recognized that because arterial blood carries alcohol to the lungs,
the amount of alcohol in the alveolar air is "the best practical
measure of alcohol in the brain during the absorptive phase." Id.
Consequently, the court concluded that the breathalyzer is the
most practical method for measuring a person's blood-alcohol
level. Id.
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Next, the majority addressed the "operative inquiry," of
whether the breathalyzer erroneously overestimates a driver's
blood-alcohol level. Id. The court's analysis focused on the accuracy of using a 2100:1 breath to blood conversion rate. Id. In
dismissing the defendant's assertion that such a ratio was inaccurate, Justice Garibaldi determined that the 2100:1 ratio was the
most equitable standard. Id. The justice reasoned that because
most people have a 2300:1 partition ratio, a 2100:1 standard is
more likely to underestimate a defendant's blood-alcohol level,
thereby providing them with the "benefit of doubt." Id. at 460,
569 A.2d at 247. Justice Garibaldi also noted that scientific opposition failed to establish that biological factors such as "mouth
temperature, gender, body temperature, medication, menstrual
cycle and oral contraceptives" are "sufficiently concrete as to be
significant" in compromising the breathalyzer's conclusion. Id.
Finally, while the court acknowledged that the breathalyzer did
fail 2.3 percent of the time, it reasoned that no method was 100
percent accurate. Id. at 462, 569 A.2d at 248. The court, therefore, held that the breathalyzer was the most "reliable and indispensable tool for law-enforcement purposes." Id. at 463, 569
A.2d at 248.
The majority then addressed the issue of whether New
Jersey's DWI statute, which "refers to .10% as measured by the
weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood," was intended to be
ascertained by breath-alcohol levels. Id. The court resolved this
ambiguity by interpreting the statute's purpose in light of its legislative history, federal incentive programs, and previous state
supreme court decisions. Id. at 464, 569 A.2d at 248-49. Consequently, the court concluded "that the legislature intended the
breathalyzer to be a measure of inebriation and not just blood
alcohol." Id. at 468, 569 A.2d at 251. Moreover, the court asserted that it was "not only the best practical tool, but the tool
the legislature intended to" be conclusive evidence of DWI. Id.
In conclusion, the court declared that breathalyzer results would
continue to be the proper indicator of a per se DWI violation,
entitled to judicial notice and immune from extrapolation evidence. Id. at 469, 569 A.2d at 251.
Justice Stein vehemently dissented, stating that his judicial
colleagues were "afflicted with a severe case of institutional amnesia." Id. (Stein, J., dissenting). He noted that the DWI statute
was clearly based on blood-alcohol content. Id. at 470, 569 A.2d
at 251 (Stein,J., dissenting). The dissent asserted that the major-
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ity's decision "disregard[ed] not only unmistakably plain statutory language, but also its own opinions that ha[d] repeatedly
and consistently characterized the statutory violation in terms of
a prohibited amount of alcohol in the blood." Id. 569 A.2d at 252
(Stein, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, Justice
Stein stipulated that it was the "business of the legislature" and
not of the judiciary to amend the statute "to provide specifically
that the prohibited quantity of alcohol in either the breath or
blood constitutes a violation." Id. Moreover, he charged that the
majority's "taint on the judicial process" was unnecessary because "a relatively minor adjustment in the partition ratio . . .
would eliminate all material overestimates of blood alcohol." Id.
at 471, 569 A.2d at 252 (Stein, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
There is no doubt that the breathalyzer, as a measure of
blood-alcohol content, is impeachable. Justice Garibaldi
acknowleged that the breathalyzer is an inaccurate measure of
blood-alcohol 2.3% of the time. Id. at 462, 569 A.2d 248. Its use
as the exclusive test for DWI violations, therefore, tarnishes the
equitable standards of our judicial process. The consequences of
a DWI conviction lead not only to loss of license or monetary
fines, but may also include imprisonment, loss of employment,
familial hardships, and social ostracism. In light of these severe
repercussions, the supreme court's condonation of breathalyzer
results as conclusive and irrebuttable evidence of drunk-driving
raises due process and equal protection issues. Moreover, equitable principles of fairness and justice demand that this imprecise
law enforcement tool be either subjected to contestable evidence
or adjusted to eliminate its imperfections.
Frank T. Cannone

CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISION

LAW-DOUBLE

CONTAINED

IN

STATUTE

JEOPARDY-NONMERGER
DEFINING

OFFENSE

OF

DRUG DISTRIBUTION WITHIN 1,000 FEET OF SCHOOL PROPERTY IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE-State v. Blow, 237

NJ. Super. 184, 567 A.2d 253 (App. Div. 1989).
Raymond Blow was indicted on three counts for possession
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of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), possession of CDS
with intent to distribute, and possession of CDS with intent to
distribute within one thousand feet of school property. 237 N.J.
Super. at 186, 567 A.2d at 254 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:3510, -5a(l) and b(3), -7 (West Supp. 1989)). Pursuant to a plea
agreement with the Passaic County Prosecutor's Office, count
one of the indictment was dismissed. Id., 567 A.2d at 254-55.
Blow subsequently pleaded guilty to the second and third counts
of the indictment. Id., 567 A.2d at 255.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, sentenced
Blow to a period of five years imprisonment on count three. Id.
Pursuant to nonmerger language within the school zone distribution statute, the same sentence was given on count two, to be
served concurrently with count three. Id. at 186, 567 A.2d at
255. Blow was ordered, on each of the two offenses, to pay a
laboratory fee of fifty dollars, a drug enforcement penalty of one
thousand dollars, and a Violent Crimes Compensation Board
Penalty of thirty dollars. Id. In addition, the court revoked
Blow's drivers license for two years on count three and for an
additional year on count two, consecutively. Id. at 186-87, 567
A.2d at 255. Blow appealed the terms of the plea agreement contending that the refusal to merge the possession of CDS with intent to distribute conviction with the possession with intent to
distribute within 1,000 feet of a school was unconsitutional, subjecting him to double jeopardy for the same offense. Id. The
appellate division affirmed the convictions and sentences, except
as to the revocation of Blow's driver's license. Id. at 194, 567
A.2d at 259. In upholding the lower court's refusal to merge
counts two and three of the indictment, Judge Shebell, writing
for the appellate division, held that despite the overlapping elements of the two offenses the legislatively mandated nonmerger
provision is constitutionally permissible. Id. at 191-92, 567 A.2d
at 257-58.
The court began its analysis by observing that the New
Jersey Constitution affords a defendant the same double jeopardy protection guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
Id. at 189, 567 A.2d at 256. Specifically, the court noted that N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-8a(1) (West 1988), provides that when the
same act constitutes a violation of more than one statutory provision, " a defendant may not be convicted of more than one offense if... [o]ne offense is included in the other." Id. at 188, 567
A.2d at 255 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-8a(l) (West 1988)).
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The court determined that an offense is included in another if all
of its elements are part of the proof required to establish the
commission of another offense. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 18d(1) (West 1988)).
The court observed that while the United States Supreme
Court has acknowledged a prohibition against double jeopardy,
the Court has recognized an exception to the general rule when
the legislature has indicated its intent that a defendant should be
convicted of both offenses. Id. at 188-89, 567 A.2d at 256 (citing
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366-67 (1983)). The court asserted that in the present case the New Jersey Legislature has
clearly indicated that a defendant will be separately charged

under N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 2C:35-5 and -7 (West Supp. 1989). Id. at

189, 567 A.2d at 256. Thus, the court concluded that although
the offense of drug distribution is considered a lesser included
offense of drug distribution within one thousand feet of school
property, the two convictions will not merge. Id. Judge Shebell
further justified the holding as consistent with the preference
shown by the courts of this state to approach merger questions in
a flexible, as opposed to mechanical manner. Id. (citing State v.
Truglia, 97 N.J. 513, 521 (1984); State v. Mirault, 92 N.J. 492, 501-

02 (1983)).
The court recognized that the Legislature is empowered to
divide a continuous transaction into stages and punish each stage
independently, where the proscribed conduct is in fact distinct
and where separate punishment was intended by the Legislature.
Id. at 188, 191, 567 A.2d at 255, 257 (citing State v. Davis, 68 N.J.
69, 78 (1975)). The court posited that the nonmerger provision
at issue does not result in merely applying unique labels to what
is actually the same offense. Id. at 191, 567 A.2d at 257 (citing
State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 78 (1975)). Further, Judge Shebell emphasized that the nonmerger policy advances the legislative goal
of combatting and deterring drug traffic both outside and within
the school environment, and thus, is clearly within the strictures
of both the federal and state constitutions. Id.
The court next considered the appellant's contention that as
a result of faulty weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the trial court erroneously imposed the five-year maximum sentence when the presumptive sentence for his conviction
is four years. Id. at 192, 567 A.2d at 258 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:44-1f(1)(d) (West Supp. 1989)). The court rejected this argument, finding that the sentencing judge, in imposing the maxi-
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mum sentence, appropriately considered the significant risk that
the defendant will commit further offenses. Id. at 193, 567 A.2d
at 258 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-la(3) (West Supp. 1989)).
In addition, the court found no basis for the appellant's argument that the trial court's imposition of a fifty dollar laboratory fee on each of the two offenses constituted an excessive fine
in violation of the sixth amendment. Id. at 193-94, 567 A.2d at
258. The court relied on the plain language of N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:35-20a (West Supp. 1989) to conclude that having been
sentenced on two separate counts, the defendant was subject to a
mandatory laboratory fee of one hundred dollars. Id. (citing NJ.
STAT. ANN.

§ 2C:35-20a (West Supp. 1989)).

Finally, with respect to the revocation of Blow's driver's license, the court reduced the three-year suspension to twentyfour months, finding that the applicable statute mandates revocation for a period not to exceed six to twenty four months. Id. at

194, 567 A.2d at 258-59 (citing NJ.

STAT. ANN.

§ 2C:35-16 (West

Supp. 1989)).
The court's opinion in Blow illustrated the judicial deference
given to legislative pronouncements aimed at combatting social
evils. The court wisely recognized the need to balance an individual's right to be free from double jeopardy situations against
the legislature's intent in drafting a particular statutory provision. Appropriately, the court's decision placed upon the legislature the ultimate responsibility for deciding questions of public
policy. The legislature's nonmerger provision, by imposing separate penalties and the stigma of two convictions, should have the
practical effect of discouraging drug traffic within the particularly
vulnerable school environment.
Lisa Moccia
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DETAINEE-ARRESTING

PLACING LEG SHACKLES ON ARRESTEE

Is

OFFICERS

OBJECTIVELY REA-

SONABLE CONDUCT WITH RESPECT TO FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS
STATUTE AND NEW JERSEY TORT CLAIMS

ACT-Lear v. Town-

ship of Piscataway, 236 N.J. Super. 550, 566 A.2d 557 (App.
Div. 1989).
Union Township Police arrested Ruth Ann Lear in connection with a child custody dispute. Id. at 551, 566 A.2d at 558.
The Piscataway Police and Middlesex County Sheriff's Department restrained Lear with leg shackles during successive transports to the detention facilities. Id. at 552, 566 A.2d at 558.
Although Lear initially informed one of the arresting officers that
she had a physical problem with her leg, she did not assert her
complaint again while in transit. Additionally, Lear did not suffer
pain during the arrest. Lear later claimed, however, that the
shackling caused her to develop tendonitis in her left leg. Accordingly, she brought suit for personal injury against the arresting officers, Piscataway Township, and Middlesex County. Lear's
complaint alleged violations of the federal civil rights statute, 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1987), and the New Jersey Tort Claims
Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:3-1(a) and § 59:2-2(a) (West 1982).
The trial court entered summary judgment for all defendants. Lear, 236 N.J. Super. at 552, 566 A.2d at 558. In light of
the undisputed facts, the court determined that shackling the
plaintiff's legs was reasonably related to a legitimate governmental function. Id. The court also found that excessive force was
not used in conducting the arrest. Id. Lear appealed and the
New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed. Id.
Writing for the court, Judge Antell first recognized that summary judgment is appropriate where the facts are not controverted and the movant has a right to judgment as a matter of law.
Id. The court next explained that Lear's claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 erroneously relied on an alleged violation of the eighth
amendment to the United States Constitution which forbids cruel
and unusual punishment. Lear, 236 N.J. Super. at 552-53, 566
A.2d at 558. Judge Antell reasoned that the eighth amendment
guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment was applicable
only after formal adjudication, and therefore, did not pertain to
pretrial detainees. Id. at 553, 566 A.2d at 558. Instead, he noted
that the present situation was governed by due process which affords pretrial detainees protection from punishment. Id.
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Judge Antell then stated that the applicable test was the "objective reasonableness" of the officer's conduct. Id. He explained that the court must find a reasonable relationship
between the physical restraints placed on the pretrial detainee
and a legitimate governmental function. Id. Additionally, he
noted that the same standard applied to good faith challenges
under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, which protects public employees from liability if acting in good faith while enforcing the
law. Id., 566 A.2d at 558-59.
Accordingly, the court concluded that placing leg shackles
on the plaintiff fell within "the broad range of reasonableness."
Id. at 554, 566 A.2d at 559. Although noting that the necessity of
leg shackles may have been questionable here, the court deferred
to the discretion of the arresting officers. Id. Judge Antell reasoned that the shackles served an important interest in protecting
the public and in preventing an arrestee's escape. Id. Thus, absent evidence of malice or intentional infliction of harm, the
court was unwilling to deem the conduct unreasonable merely
because the plaintiff had informed one of the arresting officers
that she had a problem with her leg. Id.
On first impression, using leg shackles in connection with an
arrest emanating from a child custody dispute appears to be
questionable conduct. The court, however, correctly focused the
inquiry on whether the action was unreasonable rather than unusual. Accordingly, the court seemed to suggest that had the
plaintiff been more specific about the alleged problem with her
leg before being shackled, or repeated her complaint to anyone
else during transit, the outcome of the case may have been different. Thus, the court's decision seeks to prevent the assertion of
tenuous claims rather than restrict an individual's civil rights.
Elisa T Sorrell
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AMENDMENT-EVIDENCE

OBTAINED FROM A WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF AN AUTOMOBILE
WILL BE SUPPRESSED WHEN POLICE OFFICER ENTERS VEHICLE WITHOUT PRIOR COMMUNICATION WITH OCCUPANT-State

v. Woodson, 236 N.J. Super. 537, 566 A.2d 550 (App. Div.
1989).
Just after midnight on October 7, 1987, defendants James
Woodson and Anthony Turner were clocked traveling 70 miles
per hour on the New Jersey Turnpike. Id. at 538, 566 A.2d at
551. After stopping the automobile, New Jersey State Trooper
Gerard McHugh proceeded toward the defendants' vehicle and
without prior communication opened the passenger door. Id. at
539, 566 A.2d at 551. At that time, the trooper was in no way
concerned for his safety nor did he believe that he was in immediate peril. When Trooper McHugh opened the door a can of
beer spilled out of the car, a violation of NJ. STAT. ANN. § 39:451a (West Supp. 1989).
Prompted by suspicion of further illegality, the trooper visually scanned the interior of the vehicle looking for other open
containers of alcohol. The inspection revealed a clear plastic bag
of what appeared to be marijuana. Woodson and Turner were
ordered out of the car and were searched. The defendants were
subsequently arrested and charged with possession of an unspecified quantity of a controlled dangerous substance.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, in granting
the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained by the
warrantless search, held that the actions of Trooper McHugh
were constitutionally impermissible. Woodson, 236 N.J. Super. at
539-40, 566 A.2d at 551. The court asserted that none of the
recognized exceptions to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement were applicable when the trooper, with no compelling
concern for his safety, opened the car door without first communicating with its occupants. Id. at 539, 566 A.2d at 551.
Affirming the judgment of the trial court, the appellate division held that a police officer may not obtain evidence by opening a car door without a warrant or without prior communication
with the car's occupants. Id. at 539-40, 566 A.2d at 551-52. Such
an act is in contravention of the fourth amendment of the United
State Constitution as well as article 1, paragraph 7 of the New
Jersey Constitution. Writing for the court, Judge Antell began
his analysis by recognizing that although there is a lessened ex-
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pectation of privacy in the interior of a motor vehicle, the delineated parameters of both constitutions extend far enough to
encompass such areas. Id. at 539, 566 A.2d at 551.
With the constitutional imperative squarely set forth, the
court turned to the various contentions proffered by the state.
Id. at 539-41, 566 A.2d at 551-52. Primarily, the state argued
that because it is constitutionally permissible to require drivers
stopped for traffic offenses to step out of their vehicles, it is also
permissible for the trooper to open the car door himself. Id. at
540, 566 A.2d 551-52. (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimnims, 434 U.S. 106
(1977)). The state relied on a Minnesota Supreme Court decision in which it could discern no difference between an officer
telling a driver to step outside of his car and an officer opening
the driver's door himself. Id., 566 A.2d at 552 (citing State v. Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978)).
Judge Antell rejected this analysis, reasoning that there is a
substantial dissimilarity between ordering an occupant out of a
car and opening the car door without warning. Id. The difference, observed the court, is the opportunity for the defendant
"to safeguard from public view" those objects which he does not
wish to be seen. Id. at 540-41, 566 A.2d at 552. The court posited that the failure of the officer to give reasonable warning to
the occupant was unconstitutionally intrusive. Id.
The court next evaluated the state's argument that the beer
can and bag of marijuana fall within the ambit of the "plain view"
exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. Id. at
541, 566 A.2d at 552. The court declared that the rule applies
only where the evidence is obtained inadvertently where the police officer is lawfully in the viewing area. Id. (citations omitted).
The court stipulated that neither of the two conditions required
for the invocation of the plain view exception were present. Id.
Because the beer can fell out of the automobile when
Trooper McHugh opened the car door, the court maintained that
the trooper undertook an unconstitutional "exploratory investigation." Id. Further, the court determined the trooper's discovery of the marijuana was clearly not inadvertent, since it was
yielded after an exploration of the car's interior. Id. The court
concluded that the evidence obtained from the unreasonable
search must be suppressed. Id.
In each search and seizure case the court will examine the
course pursued by the arresting officer to determine if the evidence was reasonably obtained. Here, the court asserted that the
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trooper's failure to give the occupants of the car reasonable
warning before entering the vehicle was unconstitutionally intrusive. Although the Woodson decision can be criticized for mandating that police officers allow individuals stopped for traffic
offenses time to conceal illegal contraband, the court's declaration that an individual's right to privacy cannot be abridged by
tactical surprise is consistent with the reasonable requirement intrinsic to fourth amendment jurisprudence. Similarly, the court
reaffirmed the fourth amendment notion that "[a]n illegal search
is not validated by what it turns up." State v. Ratushny, 82 NJ.
Super 499, 505, 198 A.2d 131, 135 (1964).
While the United States Supreme Court has recently sought
to curtail the protections afforded by the exclusionary rule, the
Woodson decision will serve as a reminder to future defendants
that the New Jersey Constitution echos and expands the protections inured from the federal Constitution. Moreover, law enforcement officials have notice that the New Jersey courts will
invigorate an individuals right of privacy granted by article 1,
paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution.

Patrick C. Dunican,Jr.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

FIRST AMENDMENT

PROHIBITING CASINO KEY EMPLOYEES
"MONEY

OR THING[S] OF VALUE"

-

STATUTE

FROM CONTRIBUTING

TO POLITICAL GROUPS Is

NOT VAGUE, OVERBROAD OR VIOLATIVE OF FIRST AMENDMENT

GUARANTEES OF FREE SPEECH OR ASSOCIATION-In re Soto,

236 N.J. Super. 303, 565 A.2d 1088 (App. Div. 1989).
In 1985 when Gloria E. Soto was a licensed casino officer of
Trump Casino Hotel and Claridge Casino Hotel she was elected
to the Platform Resolution Committee of the New Jersey Democratic Party (Platform Committee). 236 N.J.Super. at 310-11, 565
A.2d at 1092. In addition to membership on the Platform Committee, Soto planned to participate in the Affirmative Action
Committee of the New Jersey Democratic Party, the New Jersey
Hispanic Democrats, and the "Committee of 200." Id. at 312,
565 A.2d at 1092-93. Soto was familiar with the provisions of
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-138 (West 1989) (§ 138) regarding sup-
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port of such candidates. Soto, 236 N.J. Super. at 310, 565 A.2d at
1092.
Accordingly, in July 1985, Soto notified The Casino Control
Commission (Commission) of her membership on the Platform
Committee and requested that the Commission rule on how
§ 138 would affect the performance of her services as a member
of the Platform Committee and her other proposed activities.
She also requested that the Commission make a declaratory finding as to "whether her personal participation in a Committee of a
state political party is a contribution of a 'thing of value' within
the meaning of§ 138." Id. at 311,565 A.2d at 1092. In addition,
Soto requested that the Commission rule that § 138 is inconsistent with the United States Constitution.
The Commission informed Soto that it lacked jurisdiction to
resolve the constitutional question presented. Id. Thereafter,
Soto notified the Commission of her intention to file a declaratory judgment action with the superior court. Id. She requested
an indefinite adjournment of her pending administrative case. Id.
In January 1987, Soto brought an action for a declaratory
judgment challenging the proscription of a "thing of value" as
vague and overbroad. Id. Further, she challenged § 138 as an
unconstitutional infringement of the United States Constitution's
first amendment protection of free speech and association as well
as discriminatory against casino key employees under the fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection. Id. at 311-12,
565 A.2d at 1092. The defendants, the Division of Gaming Enforcement and the Casino Control Commission, both filed answers and motions to dismiss Soto's complaint. Id. at 312, 565
A.2d at 1092-93. The chancery division ruled that it properly
had jurisdiction over the constitutional challenges made by Soto,
however, it ordered the Commission to make a determination of
the meaning of a "thing of value" and how the phrase would apply to restrict Soto's proposed political activities. Id., 565 A.2d at
1093. The chancery division dismissed the Commission's motions for summary judgement without prejudice.
After a July 1987 hearing, the Commission ruled that: Soto
could be a member of the Platform Committee because she
would not be rendering "professional legal services"; she could
be a member of the Affirmative Action Committee because only
personal services, where she would express her views and advocacy of minority representation, would be involved; and she
could be a member of the New Jersey Hispanic Democrats but
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"the offer of free legal services" as an incident of membership
would constitute a "thing of value" in contravention of § 138,
and therefore, could not be rendered. Id. The Commission
barred Soto from membership on the "Committee of 200" because the annual membership fee of $1,000 would be the
equivalent of "money or thing of value" in "direct violation of

§ 138." Id.
Following this ruling, both defendants renewed their motions before the Chancery Division for a dismissal of Soto's petition. Id. at 313, 565 A.2d at 1093. Judge Gibson found § 138 to
be consistent with the United States Constitution and granted the
defendants' motions to dismiss Soto's petition. Id. Soto appealed both the Commission's ruling on how § 138 would constrain her activities, and the superior court order dismissing her
petition. Id. at 314, 565 A.2d at 1094. On appeal, the cases were
consolidated, and the appellate court affirmed the rulings below.
Id.
Writing for the appellate court, Judge Deighan first noted
the nature of the first amendment protection of political activity.
Id. at 314-18, 565 A.2d at 1094-96 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976)). The judge reiterated the preferred position of
political speech, and the fundamental right of political expression and association under the first amendment to the United
States Constitution. Id. at 318, 565 A.2d at 1096. Conversely,
Judge Deighan distinguished political contributions from political speech as an "attenuated" form of expression which falls
outside the protected forms of "direct political advocacy." Id.
(citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-29).
Accordingly, the court held that any statute infringing on
first amendment protection would be subject to close scrutiny
and may be upheld only if there is a "compelling state interest"
to justify such infringement and the legislative means chosen to
achieve the interest are narrowly tailored and rationally related
to the compelling interest. Id. at 315, 565 A.2d 1095. The court
found that statutes infringing on a right which is not protected by
the first amendment would not be subjected to the "compelling
state interest" test. Id.
The court concluded that there is a compelling state interest
in keeping the New Jersey casino industry free from organized
crime, political corruption, and undue influence of individuals
who have high positions in the business. Id. at 319-20, 565 A.2d
at 1097-98. Judge Deighan rationalized the need for the scope of
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statutory and regulatory coverage by pointing out that when the
New Jersey Constitution was amended to include the gambling
clause, the implementation of that clause by the Casino Control
Act was on the accepted policy that the industry would be regulated with the "utmost strictness" to sustain a high level of "public confidence and trust." Id. at 319, 565 A.2d at 1097 (citing
Knight v. Margate, 86 N.J. 374 (1981)). To this end Judge
Deighan opined that the law would be employed against any impropriety associated with the casino industry or the appearance
thereof. Id. The judge noted that because the evil feared was
corruption, the legislative act proscribing casino employees from
making monetary contributions to political candidates was not
one which the court could "second guess." Id. at 321, 565 A.2d
at 1098.
Next the court considered the term "thing of value." Id. at
323, 565 A.2d at 1099. First, Judge Deighan determined that the
phrase was not overbroad or overinclusive in fulfilling the State's
interest because as applied, § 138 only restricted casino officers
or persons who hold supervisory positions, capable of exercising
discretionary powers in the regulation and operation of casinos.
Id. at 324-25, 565 A.2d at 1100. The court also found that the
term was not a vague term because it could have a common
meaning discernible by the public. Id. at 328, 565 A.2d at 1102.
Judge Deighan noted that a "thing of value" could be the
equivalent of professional services or an item of personal advantage. Id. at 327-29, 565 A.2d 1100-01. In holding that the
phrase is easily discernible by the public, the court pointed to the
sale of "professional services" in the personal service industries
for a market price. Id. at 329-31, 565 A.2d at 1102-03.
The court next opined that the petitioner's equal protection
claims of discrimination against casino key employees failed on
two fronts. Id. at 332, 565 A.2d at 1104. First, Judge Deighan
ruled that the proscription of monetary contribution does not directly restrict free speech or political communication, and therefore, a rational basis test would only require that the classification
of casino key employees be rationally related to the legitimate
state interest of maintaining the integrity of the political process
and the casino industry. Id. at 333, 565 A.2d at 1104-05. Second, the judge held that casino key employees were not a suspect
class, and thus, strict scrutiny analysis of the equal protection
clause was not applicable. Id., 565 A.2d at 1105. Assuming strict
scrutiny was applicable, the nature of classification and the indi-
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vidual interest affected, as well as "governmental interest involved," would permit the statute to stand. Id.
Finally, under the balancing test established by the New
Jersey Supreme Court, Judge Deighan ruled that the right affected and the governmental intrusion on such right would be
outweighed by the need of the public for the restriction controlling employees in an industry traditionally imbued with misconduct and criminality. Id. (citing Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99 N.J.
552, 567 (1985)).
The right to make monetary political contributions to a candidate of one's choice is neither a fundamental right, nor a new
controversy. In the instant case, the State had a legitimate and
compelling interest in keeping political contributions away from
the casino industry. Since the State's legalization of the casino
industry in 1976, it has been an unquestioned postulate that the
legitimacy of the industry can not be sacrificed by permitting casino employees to make political contributions. Id. at 318-21,
565 A.2d at 1096-98. Therefore, the court's decision not to
strike the statute is sound. It is consonant with judicial precedence on the state and federal levels and it follows the legislative
mandate under the Casino Control Act.
Additionally, the implications of the opinion are instructive.
The decision in Soto suggests to the petitioner and all others similarly situated, to staunchly support political candidates of their
choice by giving time rather than monetary or professional support. Such advocacy could take the form of the most basic first
amendment protections such as spreading pamphlets and organizing public forums for the discussion of their candidates'
views as well as to invite candidates with opposing views.
Cecilia N. Anekwe

